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Abstract
This article examines the intensely mediated debate on the relationship between 
ideological affinity and political implication that followed the documenting of the 
‘citational ecology’ of Breivik’s 2083 compendium. Focusing on the recurring 
trope of war in counter-jihad blog posts and mainstream media comment, it 
argues that the invocation of ‘war’ is important beyond limiting debates on 
incitement and ‘moral responsibility’. Following Butler (2009), it examines 
this ‘frame of war’ and its poetics as the condition of counter-jihad networks 
and as the licence for mainstream polemics on the ‘failed experiment’ of 
multiculturalism.
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The polemicist proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses 
in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he 
possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that 
struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a 
partner in the search for truth but an adversary, an enemy who is 
wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a 
threat. For him, the game consists not of recognizing this person 
as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him, as 
interlocutor, from any possible dialogue.
(Michel Foucault in conversation with Paul Rabinow, 1984)
1    Introduction: Formal perfection
In late August 2012, the French publishers Pierre Guillaume de 
Roux published two pamphlets by the writer and senior Gallimard 
editor Richard Millet. The first of those, Langue fantôme (suivi de 
Éloge littéraire D’Anders Breivik), quickly garnered the international 
controversy it sought by proposing that ‘Breivik is without doubt what 
Norway deserves, and what awaits all societies that continue to blind 
themselves in order to better deny themselves, in particular France 
and England’ (Lafitte 2012). The subject of Millet’s elegiac intent is 
not the victims of Breivik’s political murder, but rather a familiar source 
of elite lament: the self-abolishing ‘West’. Millet’s intervention was 
precisely calibrated – for, regardless of their human cost, mediatised 
events enter immediately into a symbolic economy of appropriation 
(De Zengotita 2005) – to capitalise on the coverage of the ‘sanity 
verdict’ in Breivik’s trial. In so doing, his bid for inclusion in the event 
drew on two forms of legitimation: his reading of Breivik as a ‘product’ 
of the conjuncture and of the aesthetics of his ‘acts’. 
Drawing on an argument rehearsed by, among others, the 
journalist Brendan O’Neill in the British Daily Telegraph in April 2012, 
Millet positions Breivik not just as an opponent of multiculturalism, 
but as its predictable effect and logical conclusion. According to 
O’Neill, Breivik is ‘…not an implacable foe of multiculturalism, he is 
a product of it. He is multiculturalism’s monster, where his true aim 
is to win recognition of his identity alongside all those other identities 
that are fawned over in modern Europe’ (2012). Concerned less 
with the impact of O’Neill’s capaciously understood ‘identity politics’ 
on individual liberty than on its corrosion of the ‘Christian essence’, 
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Millet reads Breivik as ‘an exemplary product of Western decadence’, 
a ‘child of the ideologico-racial fracture that extra-European 
immigration has introduced to Europe’ (in Crumley 2012).
In a radio interview with France Info, as well as in the text itself, 
Millet reproduces the geometry of violence that structured Breivik’s 
terror. European culture has been undermined by non-European 
immigration – ‘the repopulation of Europe with populations and 
cultures foreign to us’ – and this dissolution has been promoted and 
furthered by the motivated ideological projects of the left, principally 
a ‘multiculturalism’ that ‘…as it has been imported from the United 
States, is the worst thing possible for Europe. It creates a mosaic of 
ghettos in which the nation no longer exists’ (see Beaudoux & Labeyrie 
2012). Millet may draw metaphorically here from the particular, 
imagined geography of Emmanuel Brenner’s (2004) Les territoires 
perdus de la République – ‘The lost territories of the Republic’ – a 
reference to the ‘no-go’ banlieues of major French cities, but the 
racialising cipher of the ghetto is transnationally invoked as evidence 
of multiculturalism’s corrosive social impact (Lentin & Titley 2011: 
148–150). In turn, Millet’s invocation of multiculturalism reveals the 
precise geometry of violence to be a prevalent form of triangulation: 
multiculturalism favours the agents of cultural pollution, is advanced 
by the agents of cultural experiment and must be opposed by the 
subjects of cultural imposition. For Millet, the ‘formal perfection’ of 
Breivik’s ‘monstrous response’ is in large part its geometric precision, 
for all that he may protest against violence in the aesthete’s detection 
of the sublime.
In a Le Monde critique of Millet’s ‘fascist pamphlet’, the 
French writer Annie Ernaux identified the second order effect of 
this triangulation. To critique Millet’s assault on the possibility of 
democracy, she argues, is to be immediately subject to an ‘…endless 
brandishing, like a Pavlovian reflex, of freedom of expression and 
the rights of the author to say whatever’. Aware of these dominant 
discursive dynamics, Ernaux avers that any response risks 
contributing to the mediation of a particular kind of performance – 
that of the ‘courageous but beleaguered martyred writer’ (2012). 
Millet’s opportunistic appropriation, and Ernaux’s reflexive response, 
provide a point of entry to the politics of communication concentrated 
around 22/7, a politics that is the general subject of this article. 
Specifically, the article is concerned with the intensely mediated 
international debate on the relationship between ideological affinity 
and political implication that has followed 22/7. Millet’s publicity 
was derived in part from his willingness to associate himself, if only 
‘aesthetically’, with Breivik, thus occupying a space vacated hurriedly 
by a diverse range of commentators otherwise convinced by visions 
of Muslim conquest, social implosion and multicultural corrosion. 
The citational ecology of Breivik’s compendium 2083: A European 
Declaration of Independence has drawn sustained attention to these 
evacuees, chief amongst them the highly organised and financed 
arteries, and endless, idiosyncratic capillaries, of anti-Muslim online 
networks (Fekete 2012, Lean 2012). This focus emerged rapidly 
in the days following the massacre with, for example, the security 
researcher Toby Archer arguing on Monday 25th July that ‘Breivik 
is clearly a product of this predominantly web-based community of 
anti-Muslim, anti-government and anti-immigration bloggers, writers 
and activists’ (2011).
However, a singular focus on the implication of ‘keyboard 
warriors’ in Breivik’s compendium would obscure a consideration 
of the lattice of overlapping connections and affinities involved in 
the shifting ideoscape (Appadurai 1996) of European racisms. In 
a discussion of the range of politicians and commentators quoted 
in 2083, Paul Hockenos noted that ‘this political mainstreaming 
of Islamophobia would have been inconceivable without the post-
9/11 anti-Islamic discourse across European media and the 
blogosphere. In large part, this trail was blazed by intellectuals 
who defended their positions in the name of liberalism and human 
rights’ (2012). Unsurprisingly, those cited by Breivik as sources of 
inspiration countered with the contention that ‘multiculturalists’ were 
opportunistically using the ‘tragedy’ to suppress legitimate opinions. 
Robert Spencer, the founder of Jihad Watch – and the most heavily 
cited of the main ‘Counter-Jihad players’ identified by a 2012 Hope 
Not Hate report – compiled a ‘demonization round-up’ identifying the 
‘campaign taking shape’ within days of 22/7:
The intent of this campaign is clear. The scholars, politicians and 
activists who have spoken out about the threat to human rights 
and constitutional principles that jihad and Islamization pose 
have never advocated any kind of violence or illegal activity. By 
tarring them with the murders of Anders Breivik, the enemies of 
freedom hope to quash all resistance to the advance of Islamic 
supremacism in the West. (Spencer 2011)
A similar argument was made by the British journalist, Melanie 
Phillips, in her Daily Mail column on August 1 2011: ‘As soon as the 
atrocity happened, people on the Left saw a heaven-sent opportunity 
to smear mainstream conservative thinkers and writers by making a 
grossly distorted association between Breivik’s attack and their ideas.’ 
Those cited have an evident investment in reducing the question of 
ideological implication to a flat charge of causality or incitement. 
Yet, specific treatments of what is at stake in the general charge of 
implication have been lacking or left hovering around notions of a 
‘moral responsibility’ derived from ideological affinity. In noting this 
critical space between causality and affinity, Molinari and Neergaard 
argue that ‘…we are not arguing for a direct link between racist 
ideas…and acts of terrorism. However, we would like to suggest that 
violent acts are carried out more frequently in times when there is 
an opportunity structure that symbolically acknowledges, legitimizes 
and supports the world-view at the core of these actions’ (2012: 15). 
In agreeing with this proposition, this article considers the importance 
of a frame of war to the symbolic ‘opportunity structure’ noted by 
Molinari and Neergaard. 
The recurring imaginary and invocation of war, and the 
reproduction of the patriot/alien/traitor geometry of war, may not 
involve or support a declaration of war, but it provides, in Judith 
Butler’s terms, a ‘frame’. This idea is developed in Butler’s book 
Frames of War (2009), which, in asking the subtitular question 
‘when is life grievable?’ understands frames as modes of organising 
recognition and ‘recognizability’ – those conditions that ‘prepare or 
establish a subject for recognition’ (2009: 4). Butler highlights the 
critical ambivalence of the frame, in particular how the ‘sense that 
the frame implicitly guides the interpretation has some resonance 
with the idea of the frame as a false accusation’ (2009: 8). Contingent 
by virtue and necessity of their reproducibility, frames nevertheless 
structure ‘modes of recognition’ essential to the conduct of war, but 
also, for example, ‘in the politics of immigration, according to which 
certain lives are perceived as lives while others, though apparently 
living, fail to assume perceptual form as such’ (2009: 24).
In the politics of interpretation surrounding Breivik’s citations, the 
frame of war is often treated solely as an (false) accusation. Given 
that, as Liz Fekete summarises, ‘…most counter-jihadists, while 
sharing much of Breivik’s discursive frameworks and vocabulary, 
stop short of advocating violence’ (2012: 33), this reductive focus 
obscures the importance of the frame as a ‘mode of recognition’. 
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In the counter-jihad frame of war, it is less that lives fail to assume 
perceptual form than they are positioned as over-determined forms – 
race enemies and race traitors for the post-racial era. Constructed as 
theological automatons, disparate and diverse Muslim and ‘Muslim-
looking’ people are collapsed into a monolithic abstraction as carriers 
of debut-de-siècle civilizational decline: ‘The Muslim in Europe – not 
individual Muslims, not even Muslim communities, but the idea of 
the Muslim himself – has come to represent the threat of death’ 
(Goldberg 2009 165). The frame of war does not incite interlocutors 
to ‘go to war’, but to recognise that ‘we are at war’.
For Eurabia-focused conspiracy theorists (see Van Buuren 
2013) – and also those who would occupy the accommodating ‘new 
right’ position of representing the silent majority to the detached and 
distant elite – this recognition of a state of being at war demands 
the concomitant identification of what Breivik termed ‘Cultural 
Marxists’: a capacious category of left-liberal enablers involved, 
depending on the intensity of the treatise, in outright treachery or 
naive social engineering. The controversy generated by Millet 
owes in part to his endorsement of the ‘logical’ outcome of Breivik’s 
ideological coordinates (it was bound to happen, and Norway 
deserves it), as opposed to more widespread attempts to affirm the 
same ideological geometry while distancing it from his terrorism (it 
was bound to happen, but nobody deserves it). Ernaux was precise 
in diagnosing this logic as fascist; as Robert Paxton argues in his 
influential study The Anatomy of Fascism (2004), the delineation of 
internal enemies that weaken and betray the nation is perhaps the 
only consistent dimension across different forms and histories of
fascism.
Nevertheless, the prevalence of this geometry cannot be 
understood without Ernaux’s accompanying identification of Millet’s 
mediated self-positioning, whereby any critique of his arguments is 
automatically read, within this mode of recognition, as a continuation 
of the politically correct myopia of multiculturalism, furthered through 
an inevitable assault on freedom of expression. This frame of war 
thus also constitutes a system of legitimation, a mode of recognition 
that secures the tautological truth, post-racial licence and iconoclastic 
heroism of the writer or blogger. The frame of war is the condition of 
communicative participation in the propagation of ‘multicultural crisis’, 
and this article explores this prevalent construction in two sections. 
In the first, it discusses the ‘counter-jihad’ blogosphere, and by 
way of a brief analysis of the influential blog Jihad Watch, argues that 
this frame of war constitutes this discursive community by providing 
what Michael Warner (2002) describes as the ‘poetics of the counter-
public’. In the second, it broadens the critique of ‘anti-jihad’ counter-
publics to consider the ideological legitimation sought in the more 
expansive frame of ‘multicultural crisis’. By examining examples of 
the prevalence in mainstream polemics of Millet-style positionings 
on the terrain of ‘war’, it argues that understanding the forms of 
legitimation provided by narratives of multicultural implosion draws 
attention to how Breivik’s symbolic economy and structuring political 
geometry are broadly shared and widely mediated in European 
communicative space. 
2    They called a war, 1: war as the condition  
      of a counter-public
2.1    The hypertext and the frame of war
The 2083 compendium is a hypertext, textually integrated to the 
terrain of the Western ‘crisis right’ from which it is derived and 
compiled. Breivik presented the compendium as a ‘gift’ to ‘patriotic 
minded Europeans’, and as in any gift relation, it involved an 
expectation of reciprocity – his terrorism was intended to provide a 
lens for those patriotic activists who received, and were asked to 
disseminate, the compendium. Framed, in its dissemination, as a call 
for collective action – a step in the long struggle towards a patriotic 
revolution forecast to develop in three stages in advance of final 
victory in 2083 – the fundamental geometry of war is present from 
the fourth paragraph of the introduction:
Much of the information presented in this compendium (3 books) 
has been deliberately kept away from the European people by our 
government and the politically correct mainstream media. More 
than 90% of the EU and national parliamentarians and more than 
95% of journalists are supporters of European multiculturalism 
and therefore supporters of the ongoing Islamic colonization of 
Europe; yet they DO NOT have the permission of the European 
peoples to implement these doctrines. (p. 11)
In Breivik’s frame of war, this triangular antagonism structures 
a drama of world historical proportions, predicated on the ticking 
urgency of two minutes to an Islamofascist midnight and the creeping 
establishment of ‘Eurabia’: 
Just as the older far-Right narrative had a structural need for 
a Jewish conspiracy theory in order to explain the purported 
complicity of national governments with their enemies, so too 
the counter-jihadist movement tends towards conspiracy theory. 
After all, one might ask, why the need for popular mobilisation for 
the counter-jihadist cause when European governments already 
take a tough stance on fighting ‘radical Islam’? The answer must 
be that government rhetoric about fighting Islamist ‘extremism’ is 
mere appearance; behind the scenes, ruling elites are secretly in 
league with the Islamic enemy. Hence the indispensability of the 
Eurabia conspiracy theory. (Kundnani 2012: 9)
In a post-22/7 survey of the anti-Muslim ideoscape, Fekete 
(2012) maps a knotted series of conspiracy theories along a 
spectrum from ‘internet-focused counter-jihadist activists at one 
end and neoconservative and cultural conservative columnists, 
commentators and politicians at the other’ (2012: 30). A key point 
of spectrum differentiation is between those, like Breivik, who 
propound encompassing conspiracy theories, and those who locate 
the facilitation of Muslim excess in the naïve elitism and political 
paralysis of the ‘liberal-left’. The frame of war extends beyond 
conspiracy; the intensively cited ‘anti-jihadi’ websites, and Breivik’s 
compendium, forge a totalising and tautological theory of domination 
from a purposeful bricolage of hyperlinked texts. Understood not only 
as a religion but as a totalitarian political and cultural system, any 
fragment of net-located evidence of Islamic backwardness – across 
space and anywhere in time – is accreted as further evidence of the 
global progress of this totalising drive (Carr 2006).
As the final section below discusses, this resolute differentialism 
descends from the zero-sum identitarianism of the ‘new racism’ but 
extends the cultural turn’s indignant – and strategic – repudiation of 
racism through an idealist focus on the problem of religion. Religion, 
as an intellectual framework, can theoretically be repudiated, but 
Muslims are racialised as theological automatons, and thus their very 
presence signifies a (renewed) state of multi-layered war. Immigration 
and any cultural manifestation of lived presence are understood as 
irruptions of ideological, cultural and demographic conflict. Recalling 
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the anti-Semitic fear of the assimilated Jew (Arendt 1966), ‘those 
who see an Islamic conspiracy…suggest that Muslims who do not 
signal their Muslimness …are merely posing as modern, progressive 
and westernized. They are in fact camouflaged, and this makes them 
the more dangerous’ (Fekete 2012: 35).
The resistance of patriots, therefore, is necessary to avoid 
an Islamified future spent living in dhimmitude, but resistance 
requires a concomitant assault on the hegemony of the ‘current 
cultural Marxist/multicultural elites, the New Totalitarians…the most 
dangerous generation in Western history’ (p. 30). Emasculated by 
feminism and weakened by its contribution to demographic decline 
(Walton 2012), and repressed by those multiculturalist ‘category A 
and B traitors’ who have transposed Marxism to the cultural terrain 
(Seymour 2011), cultural conservatives, Christians, nationalists and 
men are living as ‘slaves under an oppressive, tyrannical, extreme 
left-wing system with absolutely no hope of reversing the damage 
that has been caused. At least not democratically’. Thus, opposing 
the totalising drive of Islam and the totalitarian success of Cultural 
Marxism justifies a liberation struggle, a ‘preemptive war on all 
cultural Marxist/multiculturalist elites of Western Europe’. 
2.2    This war, not that war 
Writing in Open Democracy a month after 22/7, Markha Valenta 
pointed to how – in the spiralling debates evaluating Breivik and his 
actions in psychological and political terms, and in the struggle over 
the putative legitimacy of, if not his politics, his political referents – the 
political nature of the murders was relatively obscured:
Breivik’s most grotesque violence was not directed at Muslims 
or immigrants as such but at the youthful members of the Social 
Democrats…First and foremost, Breivik is a man at war with his 
own country…And it is in this alienation that Breivik is not alone: 
his attack on the left is part of a larger front of aggression across 
the west, viciously targeting all that which smacks of the ideal of 
multiculturalism. (2011) 
He may not have been alone, yet Breivik was quickly left alone, 
rapidly renounced and disowned by those determined to evade 
implication as analysis of the compendium suggested that he had 
derived ideological sustenance from the counter-jihadi blogosphere. 
A simple visualisation of gross citations, produced by Eli Clifton for the 
liberal blog Think Progress on July 24th documented 162 citations for 
Robert Spencer and Jihad Watch, 59 for Bat Y’Eor, author of the most 
influential iteration of the Eurabia thesis, and 18 for Daniel Pipes of 
the Middle East Forum, among others. As Clifton summarised, ‘while 
a citation in the manifesto is far from an endorsement of violence by 
those Breivik referenced, it is increasingly clear that the Islamophobic 
right-wing in the US influenced his views’ (Clifton 2011). In a more 
sophisticated data-mapping in early September, The Guardian 
identified what they termed ‘Counter-Jihad nodes’, an exercise which 
focused attention on Gates of Vienna and The Brussels Journal, as 
well as ‘…a dense network of 104 European nationalist sites and 
political parties. Some of these are represented in parliaments: Geert 
Wilders’ Dutch Freedom party; the French National Front; the Danish 
People’s party, the Norwegian Progress party (of which Breivik was 
briefly a member before he left, disgusted with its moderation); the 
Sweden Democrats. Others, like the EDL, are fringe groupings. Then 
there are those in between, such as the Hungarian far-right party 
Jobbik’ (Brown 2011). 
First wave distancing strategies predictably focused on ‘Lone 
wolf’ explanations. Wilders – whom Breivik cites 30 times and notes 
as a possible ally, albeit one who ‘would have to condemn us’ following 
violent action (Fekete 2012: 32) – was quick to project psychosis, and 
lament the damage Breivik had inflicted on democratic resistance 
to ‘Islamisation’ (Wilders 2012). Presaging Millet’s conjunctural 
argument, M.A. Khan, editor of islam-watch.org, wrote on July 26 that 
‘As the burgeoning and increasingly radicalized and violent Muslim 
populations distress non-Muslims all over the world…the occurrence 
of such tragic incidents with increasing frequency in future also looks 
to be a definite possibility’ (2011).
In parallel to this insistence on individual pathology, those cited 
began to defend themselves by intensifying the triangular geometry of 
political legitimation. The Oslo-based writer Bruce Bawer rehearsed 
a theme in The Wall Street Journal on July 25, later extended in his 
2012 book The New Quislings: How the International Left Used the 
Oslo Massacre to Silence Debate about Islam: ‘In Norway to speak 
negatively about any aspect of the Muslim faith has always been a 
touchy matter, inviting charges of “Islamophobia” and racism. It will, 
I fear, be a great deal more difficult to broach these issues now that 
this murderous madman has become the poster boy for the criticism 
of Islam’ (Bawer 2011).
Thus, establishing distance from implication in Breivik’s actions 
required a double discursive movement. First, the recognition of 
grim confirmation: the overlap between his diagnosis and ours is 
a testament to our consistently repressed truth. Concomitantly, 
however, this shared diagnosis does not suggest that we can in 
any way be associated with what he proposed as a cure. Where 
we spoke of war, or European implosion and multicultural treachery, 
we cannot be held responsible for actual acts of war against actual 
‘traitors’. The problem for those cited is that the internet record 
provides copious evidence of precise articulations of this geometry 
of war. Writing in 2006, Ned May of the Gates of Vienna declared 
that ‘the Jihad is a symptom…the enemy lies within. This war is a 
civil war within the West, between traditional Western culture and 
the forces of politically correct multicultural Marxism that bedevilled 
it for the last hundred years’. Arun Kundnani notes that Breivik’s title 
‘A European Declaration of Independence’ is borrowed from a 2007 
Fjordman post that replicates the logic of fascist counter-revolution: 
‘We are being subject to a foreign invasion, and aiding and abetting 
a foreign invasion in any way constitutes treason. If non-Europeans 
have the right to resist colonization and desire self-determination 
then Europeans have that right too. And we intend to exercise it’ 
(2012: 4–5).
Faced with this record, an ancillary strategy has been to insist on 
the non-performativity of language (Ahmed 2008) – to write within the 
frame of war does not bring into being the war that it names. Spencer, 
for example, when accused that his ‘martial rhetoric incited Breivik 
to murder’ countered by drawing attention to the widespread ‘use 
of martial imagery in metaphorical contexts’. A consequence of this 
strategy is a hasty recoding of forms of political speech, predicated 
on claims to broadly repressed truths – and in explicit opposition 
to the postmodern relativism of multiculturalism – as figurative and 
allegorical: ‘…any connection between radical Right statements and 
violent action were denied, in a way that suggested that a connection 
between their ideas and any form of action was in error. Deep down, 
it suggested, the ‘European crisis’ Right appeared to be arguing that 
their ideas were no sort of philosophy of action at all’ (Humphreys & 
Rundle 2011: 5–6). However, the metaphorical register is purposive, 
and the invocation of war cannot be assessed solely in terms of the 
presence or absence of manifest support for violence. Instead, the 
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frame of war and its pathological antagonisms constitute the very 
condition of communicative participation in the anti-Muslim ‘counter 
public’.
2.3    The  frame  of  war  and  the  condition of counter- 
          publics
In Michael Warner’s discussion of ‘publics and counter-publics’, 
the public is that which ‘comes into being only in relation to texts 
and their circulation’ (2002: 50). Through this circulation, and in this 
coming into being, public discourse acquires a ‘poetic function’ that 
is frequently elided by the modern emphasis on ‘rational-critical 
dialogue’. The poetics of public discourse implies ‘…not just that a 
public is self-organising, a kind of entity created by its own discourse, 
or even that this space of circulation is taken to be a social entity. 
Rather I mean that all discourse or performance addressed to a 
public must characterize the world in which it attempts to circulate, 
projecting for that world a concrete and livable shape, and attempting 
to live that world through address’ (2002: 81). The living of this world 
through counter-jihad address is animated by inclusion in the truth 
of conspiracy and the fact of war, a truth denied or effaced by the 
dominant consensus, and as such the anti-jihad public constitutes 
itself ‘through a conflictual relation to the dominant public’ (2002: 85) 
as a ‘counter-public’.
A brief discussion of the site Jihad Watch develops this analysis. 
Established in 2003 by Robert Spencer, and extensively funded by the 
David Horowitz Freedom Centre, it is, as Deepa Kumar documents, 
embedded within a well-resourced network of neoconservative, pro-
Zionist and Christian Right structures that have prospered post-9/11 
by projecting ‘the image of a vicious and menacing “Muslim enemy”’ 
(2012: 176–86). In 2083, Spencer’s readings of the Koran are 
copiously quoted in shoring up the idea of Islam as a totalising socio-
political system. The density of quotation, and Spencer’s then high-
profile role in organising the Stop Islamization of America campaign 
(Lean 2012), ensured that in the days following 22/7, the blog is 
almost fully dedicated to surveillance of the international coverage, 
to identifying and refuting different charges of implication – from 
‘moral responsibility’ to ‘influence and inspiration’ – to compiling a 
‘demonization round-up’ and identifying the ‘opportunistic’ campaign 
taking shape (Spencer 2011).
In a sample analysis of the blog-post roll – examining posts 
a month before the attacks – the conspicuous elements of the 
Islamic conspiracy theory and the geometry of war proliferate. June 
30th: regular guest Nicolai Sennels discusses ‘how Muslim parallel 
societies are truly a direct attack on our countries’. June 29th: 
regular guest ‘Marisol’ asserts that ‘Britain has imported Sharia and 
it has become increasingly entrenched in the country’. June 28th: 
Spencer frames the story of a woman being fired from the fashion 
store Abercrombie & Fitch as another instance of ‘creeping sharia’, 
where the ‘real point of her getting hired was to compel an American 
business to change its practices in order to accommodate Islamic 
norms’. The daily confirmation of these theses is unremarkable, but 
Warner’s discussion of the counter-public calls for attention to be 
paid not just to ideas, but also to poetics and form: 
A counterpublic maintains at some level, conscious or not, an 
awareness of it subordinate status. The cultural horizon against 
which it marks itself off is not just a general or wider public, but a 
dominant one. And the conflict extends not just to ideas or policy 
questions, but to the speech genres and modes of address 
that constitute the public and to the hierarchy among media….
friction against the dominant public forces the poetic-expressive 
character of counterpublic discourse to become salient to 
consciousness’. (2002: 86)
The frame of war, in this understanding, is immanent to the 
poetic-expressive character of the counter-public. Jihad Watch as 
Nathan Lean describes, involves scouring ‘daily headlines from 
news organisations in every corner of the world, compiling the most 
gruesome and sensational news stories’ (2012: 61). The daily blogroll 
is an invitation to shared surveillance – in the sample week, stories 
from 24 countries were featured – and presented as the accretion of 
evidence that has a dual character: of the truth of a global war and of 
the fact of its disavowal by the wider public. Spencer’s self-positioning 
after 22/7 may echo Millet’s strategic posture as the écrivain 
maudit, but this is derived from his consistent self-presentation as a 
misunderstood champion of human rights (a badge that recalls Corey 
Robin’s argument that post-war US reactionary thought has made a 
strategic habit of ‘absorbing and transmuting the idioms’ of the left 
[2011]). The accreted evidence is posted with a framing thought from 
Spencer, establishing idiomatic continuities across posts, and inviting 
further annotation from registered commentators. 
As Geert Lovink points out, ‘comment cultures are not emergent 
systems but orchestrated arrangements’ (2011: 52). Commentators 
are invited to involve themselves in exegesis as a moral community 
of scholars and human rights activists slowly revealing the truth in the 
teeth of mass indoctrination. A system of confirmation is thickened 
through the density of cross-posts from trusted sources (Lean 2012: 
50–51) and through the involvement of posters and commentators, 
writing as from the multiple fronts of global war. The idea that ‘we 
are alone’ is crucial to this transnational movement building – 
together alone, struggling against the ‘dominant cultural horizon’ 
from different points in space. And, constantly, struggling against 
the idiocy and treachery of the ‘enablers of Islamisation’, idiocy and 
treachery that provides ‘bonding capital’ for a community that finds 
and maintains purpose in surveying and confronting this two-pronged 
threat to its ‘way of life’. That Dhimmi Watch was established as 
the companion site to Jihad Watch is a formal recognition that this 
triangulation constitutes the form of the counter-public.  Acts of war 
can be repudiated, but the frame of war cannot be disavowed; it is the 
foundation of the counter-public’s constitution, grain of its expressive 
character, structure of its formal possibilities and condition of its 
reproduction. 
3    They called a war, 2: war as the condition of 
      contrarian positioning
3.1    Multiculturalism:   the  archaeology  of  contrarian  
         certainties
In parallel to the early cascade of accusation and repudiation in 
the ‘blogosphere’, those established commentators and politicians 
associated with ‘mainstreaming of Islamophobia in the media’ 
(Hockenos 2012) were subject to a similar scrutiny. The reaction 
was comparable, also; Melanie Phillips, for example, responding 
to a post on Liberal Conspiracy that merely drew attention to her 
citations, countered that this constituted an opportunistic smear (see 
the quotation in Introduction). Andrew Brown, in The Guardian’s 
link-data analysis, drew specific attention to the subsequent focus 
on Phillips, once again stating that ‘to appear on this list is not to 
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be complicit in Breivik’s crime’ (2011). As with the counter-jihad 
networks, thinking through the frame of war provides a route beyond 
this infinite regression.
In Phillips’ case, the frame is explicit in her defensive response: 
‘Multiculturalism and Islamic extremism raise entirely legitimate 
and very serious concerns about defending a culture from attack 
both from within and from without’ (Phillips 2011a). The familiar 
geometry of this construction recalls how the Eurabian threat has 
‘been grafted onto the anti-anti-racism and anti-cultural relativism 
frameworks that were established and normalized by the Thatcherite 
New Right during the 1980s’ (Fekete 2012: 39). The emphasis on 
defending culture and identity against the corrosive dialectic of 
alien intransigence and internal weakness is relevant beyond the 
British frame of reference, and prompts examination of the modes 
of discursive positioning and stylised contrarianism that derive from 
opposition to ‘multiculturalism’.
In 2083, ‘multiculturalism’ serves both as shorthand for a 
disintegrating social terrain and as a suffocating ideological ether, an 
institutionalised false consciousness fusing the violence of feminism, 
alienation of Cultural Marxism and disciplinary linguistic order of 
‘political correctness’. This slippage between senses of imposition 
– the social reality of dangerous admixture and the treacherous 
social engineering that engenders and values it – is critical to 
multiculturalism’s currency as a capacious object of aversion. Its 
status as an elite imposition constitutes it as a form of self-hatred 
far beyond the conspiratorial compass of the counter-jihad networks: 
in framing British multiculturalism as an institutionally enforced 
‘virtue of tolerance’, the conservative political theorist Kenneth 
Minogue regards it as motivated ‘less by love of others than hatred 
of one’s own form of life’ (2005: xiii). Minogue’s prescription of hatred 
depends on the diagnostic properties of the geometry of war, and 
this established conceit, of confronting the self-hatred suffusing the 
‘multicultural consensus’, has acted as a stable licence for the kind of 
‘mainstream’ exaggerated speech cited in 2083. While these political 
commentators eschew overt conspiracy theories for a vision of liberal 
elite naivety and paralysis, their self-positioning is also predicated 
on a war footing. The literature on racism and identitarian discursive 
formations consistently highlights the strategy and dividends of 
adopting the tragic-heroic mode of self-positioning that is immanent 
to the frame of war. 
The projection of multicultural imposition is a critical manoeuvre 
in the narratives of ‘immigrant swamping’ associated since the 
1970s/1980s with the so-called ‘new racism’ (Balibar and Wallerstein 
1991, 1981). Strategically signalling a break with the overt 
supremacism of racial hierarchies, the new racism’s intellectual circles, 
as Neil MacMaster (2000) details, were engaged in a consciously 
hegemonic project to reshape the terms of racial exclusion through 
a culturalised discourse laden with ‘commonsense’ differentialism. In 
this argument (Barker 1981), immigration is a zero-sum construction, 
and the presence of immigrants, ideologically linked to the gestation 
of ‘genuine fears’ among ordinary people, represents not just cultural 
loss but also an integral threat to a ‘way of life’. Multiculturalism, or 
cultural recognition, intensifies the zero-sum game. By accusing 
detached, cosmopolitan elites of prioritising needy minorities over 
the needs of silent majorities, the idea of a ‘right to difference’ is 
appropriated and the power relations of multiculturalism are inverted 
(and, in the similarly appropriative manoeuvres of Islamic conspiracy 
theories, hardened into evidence of abandonment and treachery). 
Much as the bloggers previously quoted regard the ‘true enemy to 
lie within’, the real culprits in this broad ‘new racism’ argument are 
not really immigrants, who ‘too have natural homes’, but those who 
provoke the inevitable conflict of naturally incompatible cultures 
through ‘experiment’. 
Such strategies lean heavily on discursive manoeuvre; ‘the very 
existence of fears about damage to the unity of the nation is proof 
that the unity of the nation is being threatened’ (Barker 1981: 16). In 
a study of the ‘new realism’ in migration debates in The Netherlands 
since the 1980s, Baukje Prins examines how the new realist position 
lays claim to the same performative truth as Barker’s herald of 
disunity. Predicated on the need to ‘face up’ to the truth of failed 
integration, the new realist ‘dares’ to face up to the problems effaced 
by the dominant multicultural consensus; merely gives voice to 
vernacular ‘common knowledge’; simply reinstates the trait of ‘plain-
speaking’ smothered by political correctness; and takes a stand 
against the damaging self-censorship of the multicultural elite (2002). 
Thus, where ‘political correctness’ has ‘gone mad’ the restitution 
of collective sanity may require extreme measures. To represent 
genuine fears of imposition and non-recognition is to be granted a 
licence to say whatever it takes, in whatever mode is necessary, to 
assert the truth of the situation and the fact of inverted oppression. 
Concomitantly, this positions any opposition that seeks to disprove or 
assuage such ordinary fears as above and beyond the ordinary, as 
a disingenuous or misguided attempt to reconstitute the multicultural 
fantasy.
3.2    It comes home to roost: After 9/11 
As several studies suggest, the mediation of 9/11 as a globally 
disjunctive event intensified the transnational translation and 
adaptation of discourses of multicultural discontent. In particular, 
the tendency to index global events to domestic populations, 
in a context where the ‘war on terror’ dramatically increased 
surveillance and foregrounding of Muslim populations, inscribed 
‘multiculturalism’ within securitarian discourses. As Poynting and 
Mason (2007) examine in their work on Australia and the UK, 9/11 
and subsequent events provided moments of ‘ideological payout’, ‘I 
told you so moments’, which posit multiculturalism as an incubator 
of problems that have violently irrupted. Similarly, Demmers and 
Mehendale (2010) examine how the murder of Theo Van Gogh was 
dominantly framed as a ‘now nobody can deny’ event, compounding 
a ‘culturalist regime of truth’, in which political discourse in the 
Netherlands drew heavily on the war on terror to supply civilisational 
explanations.
It is critical to acknowledge – but impossible to properly 
address in this article – the complex confluence of ideological 
aversion mediated by the idea of ‘multiculturalism’ over the last 
decade or so (see Fleras 2009, Lentin & Titley 2011). Not only 
has the defence of identity been augmented by the populist right’s 
strategic adoption of gender, sexuality and liberal freedoms, what 
Triadafilopoulos terms ‘Schmittian liberalism’ (2011) substantively 
articulates a ‘sharply antagonistic discourse designating putatively 
clear and inviolable boundaries of liberal-democratic conduct’ among 
politicians, journalists, academics and ‘aspirant public intellectuals’ 
(2011). The frame of war contracts as domestic struggles over the 
putative dimensions of multiculturalism are constructed as localised 
expressions of a wider struggle, with the transnational ‘idea of the 
Muslim’ providing the legitimating continuum.
These ‘localised expressions’, as Vertovec and Wessendorf 
show, were organised and narrated as a convergent European 
reckoning, through a ‘striking’ ‘…rise, simultaneity and convergence 
of arguments condemning multiculturalism’ (2009: 7). A recurring set 
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of ‘crisis idioms’ mediated responses to ‘key incidents’, responses 
that, as with the accretive logic of blog-posting, lifted ‘events’ from 
their contexts and flattened them into supplementary confirmation of 
the totalising gaze of war. Again, the published record is brimming 
with martial invocation, and the high-profile focus on Melanie Phillips’ 
citations should not distract from the banality of this discourse 
among established commentators. Reacting to one of Vertovec 
and Wessendorf’s key events, the well-known Irish columnist 
Kevin Myers framed the Jyllands Posten cartoon crisis as a front 
in the multi-layered war: ‘As I have said many times, we are war: 
a generational, cultural, ethical, political, terrorist and demographic 
war. Sure we can give ground on the issue of the cartoons of the 
Prophet by beheading a few Danish cartoonists, thereby giving the 
Islamicists their Sudetenland’ (2006). Christopher Caldwell, the 
celebrated Newsweek journalist, who cautions that ‘multiculturalism 
has diluted the essence of Europe’, provided a crisis digest in The 
Financial Times, following the murder attempt on Kurt Westergaard 
in January 2010:
The rise of Geert Wilders’s party in the Netherlands, the 
referendum to ban minarets in Switzerland, the proposed ban on 
burkas in France – these are all desperate measures to declare 
that Islam is not the first religion of Europe. “This is a war,” the 
mainstream French weekly L’Express editorialised in the wake of 
the attempt on Mr Westergaard’s life. “To flee this conflict would 
be to buy tranquillity [sic] today at an exorbitant price in blood 
tomorrow.” It concluded: “Banning every kind of full-body cover 
[the burka] in our public spaces is a necessity.” This is not the 
non-sequitur it appears to be. (2010)
In this relief, Phillips’ war-like citations are generic, but require 
underlining: in an article lamenting the ‘erosion of national identities 
in Europe’ and quoting Bat Y’Eor, she described the 2005 Parisian 
émeutes as a ‘French intifada, an uprising by French Muslims 
against the state’ (2005). Writing after the 9/11 attacks and advising 
‘liberal Britain’ to ‘get real and ditch the multiculturalism that is now 
a menace to life and liberty’, she warned of ‘thousands of alienated 
young Muslims, most of them born and bred here but who regard 
themselves as an army within, are waiting for an opportunity to 
destroy the society that sustains them’ (2001).
‘Multiculturalism’, though invoked in this frame of war with 
instrumental plasticity, is both a threshold and a horizon. It is the 
threshold of projected consensus that the polemicist must bravely 
transgress: given its proven experimental failure, the truth must 
be told, cultural hierarchy no longer disavowed, and thus crisis 
legitimation marks a significant departure in the reconfiguration of 
‘new’ racism’s logics. For established polemicists, writing in widely 
circulated publications, the threshold must be continually renewed 
as a condition of their transgressive status. The threshold is renewed 
by presenting it as a horizon; the ‘hegemonic position’ as Sara 
Ahmed writes, ‘is that liberal multiculturalism is the hegemony’ 
(2008). Multiculturalism’s implacable contrarians can never permit 
the sun to set on its empire, for, to revisit Warner’s insights, the 
mainstream polemicist’s claim to self-positioning requires ‘friction 
against the dominant public forces’. Renewing the multicultural 
horizon, puncturing it repeatedly with the force of disavowed 
truth, is to enact a public status through a claim to counter-
publicity, a claim that necessitates, but also licences, the ‘poetic-
expressive character’ of exaggerated speech and premonitions 
of war. 
4    Conclusion
Breivik’s declaration of ‘pre-emptive war’ has focused attention on the 
prevalence of rhetoric and imaginaries of multi-layered war, not only in 
the anti-Muslim blogosphere but in and across ‘mainstream’ political 
comment. By focusing on the idea of a ‘frame of war’, the aim of this 
article has been to broaden discussion on this communicative politics 
beyond reductive debates on causality and moral responsibility. The 
poetics that shape and perpetuate the reflexive community of anti-
Muslim online formations, and the inversions and exaggerations 
that legitimate the self-positioning of multiculturalism’s polemical 
critics, depend on the frame of war violently enacted on 22/7.  While 
the cultural tendency to associate extremism with the internet has 
prompted significant journalistic concentration on counter-jihad 
networks, post 22-7, the prevalence of exaggerated speech in 
conventional media formats has been given less sustained analysis. 
As a consequence and possibility of the ‘contrarian’ speaking 
positions outlined, the consistent delineation of the Muslim threat, 
and the dangerous naivety and complicity of multiculturalists, has 
provided a routine mode of legitimation for ‘crisis’ rhetoric. The 
seductive possibilities of this mainstream contrarianism, extended by 
the currency of exaggerated speech in the ‘comment economy’ of 
contemporary media, has ensured that those that fashion themselves, 
Millet-style, as breakers of taboos must always find more and better 
taboos to break. In an interview with the London Times in 2007, the 
novelist Martin Amis captured this dynamic by conducting a ‘thought 
experiment’, saying:
There’s a definite urge - don’t you have it? - to say, ‘The Muslim 
community will have to suffer until it gets its house in order.’ What 
sort of suffering? Not letting them travel. Deportation - further 
down the road. Curtailing of freedoms. Strip-searching people 
who look like they’re from the Middle East or from Pakistan... 
Discriminatory stuff, until it hurts the whole community and they 
start getting tough with their children. (Hoare 2008)
The idea of the ‘thought experiment’, of thinking the unthinkable, 
signifies the position of the thinker in the vanguard of those that 
recognise the depths of multicultural crisis. And, for that vanguard, the 
recited truth of  ‘multicultural crisis’ has been a political gift rather than 
a political curse, its ‘relativism’ less a problem than an opportunity 
for political renewal. Without the consistent identification of crisis, the 
‘nation’ or ‘values’ being defended would lose much of their supposed 
stability. Beyond the question of implication, an issue which merits 
further investigation in the public cultures that witness this self-
positioning is how propagating this frame of war could have been 
considered to be a politically cost-free exercise, even before Utøya.
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Notes
http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html
With the exception of the introductory example, the examples 
and references discussed in this article are drawn from 
Anglophone sources. Translations from French sources by the 
author. For further details of the methodology, see endnote 11 
(below). 
Appadurai’s (1996) discussion of the ‘ideoscape’ as a terrain 
of global cultural flows is closely linked to the circulation, 
transposition and translation of modern political discourses and 
their institutionalisation by states. However, the terms has also 
come into use as a way of capturing how ideas and narratives 
are circulated, particularised and transformed through networks 
of exchange and transnational processes of mediatisation. 
I employ it here in this latter sense to attempt to capture a 
terrain of exchange that overlaps with but is not restricted to the 
‘blogosphere’. 
http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/counter-jihad/
Breivik, as Richard Seymour argues, assembles a ‘particular 
set of ideological articulations that make this fascism far more 
adequate to 21st-century circumstances than the tenets of 
extant neo-Nazi groups’ (2011).
The blog is maintained by the Center for American Progress 
Action Fund.
Jihad Watch features pieces written by Spencer and articles 
posted by him, sometimes from allies, but predominantly news 
articles posted with a limited, interpretative framing comment. 
Fekete (2012) shows that Spencer’s authored writings are 
cited 64 times. The politics of citation was intensively contested 
immediately after July 22: July 26 Daniel Greefield posted an 
article on Frontpage Magazine picking through the citations and 
accusing news outlets who had focused on Spencer’s citation 
as being set on ‘silencing researchers who have put years of 
effort into exposing networks of radicals’.  http://frontpagemag.
com/2011/dgreenfield/in-defense-of-robert-spencer/ (last 
accessed 17/12/12) .
Brown, like Clifton, noted that ‘to appear on this list is not to be 
complicit in Breivik’s crime’. 
‘The emperor is naked’, Gates of Vienna (26 September 2006), 
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2006/09/emperor-is-naked.
html
Demonisation round-up http://www.jihadwatch.org/2011/07/
The study referenced examined every blog post on Jihad Watch 
from 22 to 30 June 2011 for references to ‘war’ and martial 
imagery. The period chosen was the month running up to the 
22 July 2011, and the study qualitatively examined every article 
posted by Robert Spencer or a regular guest blogger for the 
occurrence of war and martial imagery in the headlines and 
body of the text. It further mapped the sources of cross-posted 
blog posts and mainstream media articles, and the incidence 
and recurring ratios of political-geographical locations of 
stories about Islam. The study did not consider the comment 
threads. The references to war were first collated through 
content analysis, and analysed discursively in relation to the 
construction of the ‘counter-public’ as theorised in the article. 
This observation about discourse should not be read as 
underplaying the impact of ‘traitor list’, ‘campus watch’ and 
other forms of surveillance and intimidation stemming from this 
framework.
The emphasis placed on the hegemonic turn to ‘new’ cultural 
differentialism is not to posit a reductive transition from biological 
or naturalist racism to culturalist or historicist racism. For 
discussions of the historical imbrication of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ 
in racial formations, see Goldberg (2009) and Lentin (2004).
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